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Abstract		Recent	 developments	 in	 communication	 and	 information	 technology	 have	 disrupted	 the	 long-established	dominance	of	mass	media	over	the	production	and	distribution	of	news.	As	an	effort	to	reclaim	their	role	of	society’s	 information	gatekeeper,	media	companies	absorb	digital	 technology	as	instruments	of	institutional	power	to	reproduce	its	own	logic	in	the	digital	space.	This	paper	dis-cusses	 two	 interrelated	modalities	 of	 algorithmic	 news:	 economically	 efficient	 production,	where	news	 outlets	 utilize	 quantitative	 metrics	 to	 improve	 content	 effectiveness	 and	 desirability;	 and	shared-gatekeeping,	where	visibility	 and	distribution	of	 information	are	 contextual	 and	based	on	users’	behaviour.	The	paper	proposes	that	algorithmic	media	hides	under	its	supposed	objectivity	and	 neutrality	 to	 become	 a	 new	 gatekeeper	 “organism”,	which	 not	 only	 regulates	 flows	 of	 infor-mation,	but	also	interprets	and	negotiates	both	public	interests	and	the	value	of	the	news.	
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Introduction		The	production	of	the	news	follows	a	simple	process:	selection	of	events,	construction	of	a	narrative	that	 reports	on	 the	main	 features	of	 these	 events,	 and	distribution	of	 these	 stories.	These	opera-tions	are	carefully	conducted	by	journalists	and	editors,	and	managed	through	a	generally	agreed-upon	collection	of	rules	and	protocols	through	which	the	goal	is	to	represent	reality	and	inform	the	public,	but	also	functioning	as	information	gatekeepers	(Wolf,	1987).	However,	digital	technologies	have	disrupted	this	paradigm:	blogs,	social	networks,	mobile	media,	and	search	engines	unlock	and	“democratize”	the	means	of	news	production,	distribution,	and	consumption,	enabling	anyone	with	the	technological	means	to	become	a	“journalist”.	Consequently,	newspapers	have	had	their	role	as	gatekeepers	questioned	while	the	very	concept	of	news	has	been	challenged	(Bentes,	2015;	Carlson,	2007,	Ramonet,	2013).	In	response	to	this	threat,	and	as	a	strategy	to	reclaim	their	role	as	gatekeepers,	media	compa-nies	began	to	integrate	computer	algorithms	in	their	practice	(e.g.,	The	Boston	Globe,	The	Huffing-ton	Post,	Vox	Media,	Associated	Press).	As	a	result,	a	clear	trend	in	newsmaking	has	emerged:	tech-nology	development	is	driving	toward	the	personalization	of	our	news	experience	(Gillespie,	2014;	Napoli,	2014;	O’Neil,	2016).	Everything	we	click,	read,	search,	and	watch	is	the	result	of	some	deli-cate	optimization	process	 that	uses	our	own	social	 interactions	 to	determine	what	we	 see	 in	our	newsfeed	 (McKelvey,	2014)1.	This	 is	 the	building	block	of	 the	 so-called	 social	media	 filter	bubble	
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(Pariser,	2012),	in	which	people	are	exposed	only	to	information	from	like-minded	individuals,	am-plifying	confirmation	bias.	One	of	the	particularities	of	the	“algorithmic	turn”	in	the	media	sector	is	related	to	the	intensive	use	 of	 digital	 technologies	 and	 large	 volumes	 of	 data	 (i.e.,	 big	 data)	 to	 enhance	 decision-making	about	 the	production	of	 content	and	 the	preferences	of	 the	audience.	According	 to	O’Neil	 (2016),	the	general	assumption	is	that	algorithmic	media	has	more	objective	and	efficient	ways	to	deliver	content	to	the	public	using	a	user-centric	model:	the	news	becomes	contextualized	in	relation	to	the	reader.	It	is	a	response	to	“growing	quantities	of	available	data,	as	well	as	a	motivator	for	media	or-ganizations	to	gather	ever	more	data	 from	every	available	source	to	 feed	 into	massive	processing	capacities	 of	 these	 algorithms”	 (Napoli,	 2014,	 p.	340).	 However,	 “algorithms	 are	 encoded	 proce-dures	for	transforming	input	data	into	a	desired	output,	based	on	specified	calculations”	(Gillespie,	2014,	p.	167).	That	is,	algorithmic	media	are	becoming	the	fundamental	principle	that	governs	the	flows	of	information	on	which	we	depend.	This	paper	proposes	 that	algorithmic	media	 is	a	new	 form	of	gatekeeper	 “organism”,	 in	which	they	not	only	regulate	flows	of	 information,	but	also	 interpret	and	negotiate	both	news	value	and	public	interests.	To	demonstrate	that	algorithmic	media	is	not	disrupting	journalism	practices	and	values,	but	rather	reproducing	them	in	the	digital	space,	this	paper	examines	two	interrelated	mo-dalities.	First,	it	considers	the	efficiency	of	news	productions,	where	media	companies	utilize	auto-mation	and	A/B	 testing	 to	 improve	effectiveness	and	desirability	of	 content.	Next,	 it	 analyzes	 the	visibility	 and	 distribution	 of	 information	 based	 on	 user	 behaviour,	 location,	 and	 other	 non-disclosed	attributes,	as	a	form	of	shared	gatekeeping.		
Media	Institutions:	Gatekeeping	and	Newsmaking		It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 constitutive	 practices	 and	 functions	 of	 journalism	before	 jumping	into	the	examination	of	how	digital	tools	are	changing	newsmaking.	Journalism	is	traditionally	un-derstood	as	 an	 institution	 residing	at	 the	 intersection	of	 complex	economic	organizations	 and	an	equally	complex	set	of	norms	and	procedures	related	to	its	professional	practice	(e.g.,	public	inter-est,	objectivity)	(Napoli,	2014).	Typically,	news	production	is	carefully	executed	by	journalists	and	editors	through	a	process	that	involves	selection,	report,	and	distribution	of	information,	following	a	generally	agreed-upon	collection	of	rules	and	protocols	 in	which	the	goal	 is	 to	represent	reality	and	inform	the	public	(Deuze,	2005;	Wolf,	1987).		For	Lesage	and	Hackett	(2014),	journalism	is	a	response	to	a	“problem	of	scale”	in	society:	“peo-ple,	as	part	of	a	‘self-informing	populace’,	are	unable	to	consider	distant	current	events	and	so	turn	to	journalism	as	a	way	of	understanding	what	is	happening	in	the	present-day	world”	(p.	41).	This	resonates	with	what	Lippmann	(1997)	 labels	 intelligence	work:	“not	to	burden	every	citizen	with	expert	 opinions	 on	 all	 questions,	 but	 to	 push	 that	 burden	 away	 from	him	 towards	 a	 responsible	administrator”	(p.	399).	Indeed,	according	to	Deuze	(2005),	one	of	the	journalism’s	core	values	is	to	“provide	a	public	service	(as	watchdogs	or	‘newshounds’,	active	collectors	and	disseminators	of	in-formation)”	(p.	447),	that	is,	to	keep	the	public	informed	about	what	is	current	and	important.	Con-sequently,	newspapers	and	media	companies	 in	general,	are	gatekeepers	 that	control	 flows	of	 in-formation,	and	have	the	power	to	decide	what	can	be	said	and	who	is	authorized	to	say	it.	The	concept	of	the	gatekeeper	was	developed	by	Lewin	(1947)	when	he	was	studying	the	social	dynamic	presented	within	a	group	of	people,	in	particular	with	problems	related	to	food	habits.	He	observed	that	information	flows	through	different	channels	which	can	also	function	as	gates	or	fil-ters.	Generally,	in	a	process	of	communication,	there	are	individuals,	or	groups	of	individuals,	who	hold	 the	power	 to	 control	 the	 flow	of	 information	—	 the	 gatekeepers	 (Wolf,	 1987).	This	 concept	
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was	later	applied	by	White	(1950)	to	mass	media,	in	which	he	showed	that	the	selection	and	filter-ing	of	news	places	 lower	priority	on	 individual	subjectivity,	and	higher	priority	on	a	collection	of	norms	 and	 values	 that	 include	 both	 professional	 and	 organizational	 criteria,	 such	 as	 efficiency,	speed,	ideology,	and	public	interest.	Fifty	years	later,	Shoemaker,	Eichholz,	Kim,	and	Wrigley	(2001)	confirmed	the	gatekeeping	phenomenon	in	a	more	contemporaneous	newsroom.	Singer	(2006),	on	the	 other	 hand,	 claims	 that	 online	 journalism	 began	 to	move	 away	 from	 these	 practices;	 her	 re-search,	however,	was	conducted	before	the	rise	of	social	and	mobile	media,	and	the	adoption	of	al-gorithms	by	news	companies.	The	gatekeeping	 function	 in	mass	media	 is	 exercised	 in	decisions	 involving	 selection	of	 topics	and	sources,	message	encoding	and	formatting,	and	news	distribution	and	visibility.	It	is	precisely	the	 gatekeeping	 function	of	newsmaking—and	 the	 routines	 and	protocols	of	 everyday	news	pro-duction—that	gives	newspapers	and	media	organizations	the	power	and	authority	to	represent	so-cial	 reality	 to	 the	 public.	 The	 organization,	 structural	 requirements,	 and	 the	 techno-expressivity	characteristics	inherent	in	each	mass	communication	medium	are	fundamental	elements	in	deter-mining	the	reproduction	of	social	reality	provided	by	mass	media	(Wolf,	1987).	After	all,	the	main	purpose	of	any	news	organization	is	to	provide	reports	of	meaningful	events	(Deuze,	2005).	How-ever,	one	may	ask	which	events	are	considered	sufficiently	interesting,	meaningful,	and	relevant	to	become	news.	As	 a	 complex	 institution,	 journalism	 follows	 a	 collection	 of	 systematic	 protocols	 to	 make	 the	news.	Journalists	cannot	redefine	the	criteria	for	selecting	the	news	each	time	a	new	event	occurs;	this	would	make	their	work	impractical.	Hence,	criteria	of	relevance	were	developed	to	define	the	“newsworthiness”	and	 “news	value”	of	each	event;	 that	 is,	 the	capability	of	an	event	 to	become	a	news	 event.	 These	 are	 a	 series	 of	 paradigms	 and	 protocols	 (parameters,	 task,	 pathways,	 values)	which	in	turn,	are	naturalized	through	the	professional	practice,	producing	a	journalistic	ideology:	practical	rules	embedded	in	professional	knowledge	(including	“involuntary	distortions”)	that	 im-plicitly,	 and	 sometimes	 explicitly,	 guides	 newsmaking	 operations	 and	 procedures	 (Deuze,	 2005).	These	protocols,	the	conventions	of	professional	journalism,	are	created	not	only	to	determine	what	should	be	considered	the	news,	but	also	to	legitimate	the	news	production	process:	from	the	selec-tion	of	sources	and	topics,	to	the	way	the	content	is	crafted.	The	main	objective	of	these	protocols	is,	therefore,	to	create	a	procedure	for	newsmaking	in	order	to	make	the	journalism	practice	feasible	and	manageable	(Wolf,	1987).	However,	the	‘news	value’	operates	in	a	peculiar	manner.	On	one	hand,	news	selection	is	a	deci-sion	process	made	at	speed,	thus,	the	set	of	criteria	must	be	quick	and	easy	to	apply	in	order	to	ease	the	 cognition	 burden	 on	 the	 professional.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 these	 criteria	 should	 be	 flexible	enough	to	adapt	to	any	circumstance	and	to	a	variety	of	different	events.	They	should	allow	quick	comparisons	between	other	available	events,	which	 is	key	 in	determining	whether	to	add	or	sup-press	the	news	from	the	newspaper’s	edition	and	other	streams	of	 information	(i.e.,	TV,	radio,	 In-ternet).	 Ultimately,	 these	 criteria	 should	 be	 oriented	 to	 guarantee	 efficiency	 within	 the	 system,	keeping	the	flow	of	information	at	a	steady	pace	with	a	minimum	time	expenditure,	effort,	and	re-sources.	Wolf	 (1987)	argues	 that	 the	rigour	of	 the	 ‘news	value’	 is	not,	 therefore,	an	abstract,	well	structured,	and	theoretically	coherent	classification	system;	rather,	it	is	a	logic	of	classification	that	aims	to	achieve	practical	purposes	in	a	planned	manner	and	which	is	designed,	above	all,	to	enable	the	repetition	of	certain	procedures.		
Algorithmic	Media		
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Recent	developments	in	information	and	communication	technology,	particularly	the	introduction	of	 algorithmic	 media,	 have	 changed	 practices	 and	 values	 in	 the	 newsmaking	 industry.	 Gillespie	(2014)	argues	that	algorithms	play	a	key	role	in	“selecting	what	information	is	considered	most	rel-evant	to	us,	a	crucial	feature	of	our	participation	in	public	life”	(p.	167).	Napoli	(2014)	suggests	that	they	are	 the	 “base	structures	and	parameters	 that	 regulate	 the	production,	distribution,	and	con-sumption	of	content”	(p.	343).	In	fact,	when	algorithms	are	considered	as	a	collection	of	rules	and	predefined	 tasks	and	procedures,	 their	 functionalities	and	effects	map	quite	closely	alongside	 the	practices	 of	 journalists	 and	media	 institutions.	Algorithms	 enact	many	kinds	 of	 control	 and	 fit	 in	what	Franklin	(1999)	describes	as	a	prescriptive	technology.	These	computational	routines	involve	matters	of	representation	and	inclusion:	they	define	a	certain	way	—	a	process	or	a	prescription	—	to	do	something.	These	“protocols”	(Galloway,	2006)	are	a	 formalized	set	of	rules	and	values	that	not	only	makes	the	results	of	any	activity	more	predictable,	but	also	excludes	all	other	possibilities	to	engage	on	such	activity.		The	power	of	digital	media	 is	not	on	what	 they	present	 in	a	visible	 format,	but	 in	 its	 intricate	network	of	codes	and	protocols,	that	is,	in	the	algorithms	that	collect,	transform,	and	generates	the	content.	Algorithms	are	unreachable	and	hidden	not	only	 inside	of	highly	complex	calculation	but	also	protected	by	intellectual	property	laws	(Bucher,	2012).	These	codes	are	the	‘formalization’	of	hegemonic	practices,	a	set	of	strict	and	proper	rules	based	on	a	specific	system	of	ideological	con-ventions	 that	 determines	 its	 power	 relations	 (Franklin,	 1999).	 Prescriptive	 technologies	 aim	 for	predictability	in	its	power	relations	—	a	way	to	not	only	anticipate	results,	but	the	order	of	things.	In	fact,	digital	technology	becomes	an	agent	of	ordering	and	structuring:	every	act	becomes	stored	as	 footprints	 of	 social	 transactions	 and	 available	 for	 future	 reference.	 It	 is	 used	 to	 regulate,	 in-clude/exclude	actors,	open/close	doors,	as	well	as	provide	means	to	know	more	about	the	world,	how	to	organize	this	knowledge,	and	who	is	authorized	to	access	it.	In	fact,	algorithms	cannot	be	disconnected	from	the	processes	that	create	them.	They	are	not	just	pieces	of	code	running	on	machines	making	automatic	decisions,	but	also	an	intermingling	of	pre-established	 technical	 protocols,	 professional	 practices,	 and	 social-economic	 interests.	 Moreover,	they	should	be	 thought	of	as	actors	 in	a	complex	network	of	communication.	Latour,	 Jensen	Ven-turini,	Grauwin,	and	Boullier	(2012)	define	actors	as	not	only	humans	and	human	groups,	but	also	nonhumans	operating	on	equal	footing	to	affect	social	conditions:	institutions,	biological	elements,	technological	 artefacts,	 and,	 of	 course,	machines.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 concept	 of	 algorithmic	media	seeks	to	avoid	overemphasizing	the	importance	of	any	single	algorithm,	software,	or	platform.	They	are	systems	composed	of	many	different	algorithms	that	cooperate	and	compete	with	one	another	(McKelvey,	2014),	and	have	the	capability	to	shape	user	behaviours,	influence	preference	formation,	and	impact	content	production	decisions.	That	 is,	algorithmic	media	mediate	flows	of	 information	between	people,	institutions,	and	other	social	agents.	Considering	that	algorithms	are	a	collection	of	codes	of	conduct,	communication	protocols,	and	idiosyncratic	codes	(Galloway,	2006),	they	can	be	seen	as	the	base	layer	of	any	professional	practice,	including	journalism.	Just	as	in	a	microcomputer	the	operating	system	is	the	basic	framework	that	prescribes	the	proper	rules	of	operation	to	a	word-processing	program,	 in	media	 institutions,	 the	professional	 rules	 and	 codes	 of	 conduct	 define	 the	 rules	 of	 operation	 for	 their	 activities	 (Napoli,	2014).	Algorithmic	mediation	is,	therefore,	a	translation	of	a	set	of	rules	and	values	already	estab-lished	by	traditional	practice	into	another	milieu.	It	is	a	“formalization”	of	current	practices	—	writ-ten	and	non-written	—	materialized	into	computer	codes:	a	routine,	as	it	is	called	by	programmers.	When	algorithms	are	used	to	control	operations	of	communication,	particularly	when	they	take	over	the	main	functions	of	newsmaking	and	journalism	(selection,	production,	distribution,	and	re-ception	of	the	news),	they	can	be	a	powerful	tool	for	regulating	information	flow	(Gillespie,	2014).	
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Moreover,	they	can	be	used	to	govern	users’	behaviour	in	ways	that	are	not	always	obvious	since	the	 code	 is	 usually	 protected,	 opaque,	 and	not	 easy	 to	 read	 or	 even	 to	 be	 stopped.	 Thus,	we	 can	think	of	 algorithmic	media	as	a	new	 form	of	gatekeeper	 “organism”	 that	 regulates	 flows	of	 infor-mation	with	the	capacity	to	influence	public	opinion.		
Efficient	Production		Media	organizations	are	 increasingly	turning	to	data	and	algorithms	to	 find	efficient	ways	to	pro-duce	and	deliver	content	(C.	W.	Anderson,	2013).	One	common	practice	is	to	learn	what	their	audi-ence	wants	next.	Netflix,	for	instance,	has	been	investing	in	the	creation	of	original	content	based	on	the	 users’	 behavioural	 data	which	 the	 company	 harvest	 continuously	 from	 their	 system	 (ratings,	number	of	shows	viewed,	hours	spent	on	each	show,	etc.)	(Vanderbilt,	2013).	Transferring	produc-tion	decision	to	the	machine	may	seem	to	be	a	disruption	in	the	realm	of	the	motion	pictures,	long	praised	as	a	form	of	art.	Rather,	it	is	a	continuity	in	the	logic	of	capital.	Systematization	and	optimi-zation	 are	not	 strange	 to	 capitalist	 society	 (Dyer-Witheford,	 1999),	 since	 companies	 are	 continu-ously	looking	for	the	most	effective	and	profitable	way	to	produce	a	new	product.	The	next	sections	explore	how	 this	 tendency	 can	be	problematic	 in	 the	newsmaking	domain	 since	 it	deals	not	only	with	 the	distribution	of	 information	as	a	public	good	but	also	with	 the	 formation	of	opinions	and	ideologies.	
	
A/B	Testing	
	To	 an	 increasing	 extent,	 news	 organizations	 are	 becoming	 dependent	 on	 algorithmic	 analyses	 of	various	 forms	of	user	behaviour	and	 feedback	data	 to	better	define	 their	news	gathering	and	 re-porting	activities	 (Napoli,	 2014).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	problem	 lies	 in	 the	 role	 that	 algorithms	play	 in	making	sense	of	this	data,	and	how	these	algorithmic	analyses	then	affect	content	decision-making.	Consider	the	A/B	testing,	a	practice	being	implemented	in	many	editorial	companies,	including	The	Boston	Globe,	The	Huffington	Post,	Vox	Media,	and	Buzzfeed,	to	optimize	headlines	and	images	in	their	stories	online	(Soberman,	2013).	While	this	technique	has	been	used	in	scientific	experimental	research	and	for	marketing	purposes	for	decades	(O’Neil,	2016),	it	is	only	recently	that	news	organ-izations	began	to	use	A/B	testing	to	understand	how	readers	engage	with	the	news.		From	an	editorial	perspective,	 increasing	reader	engagement	could	potentially	correlate	with	a	growing	 informed	audience,	which	 is	 commonly	 said	 to	be	part	 of	 a	news	organization’s	mission	(Deuze,	 2005).	Not	 surprisingly,	 this	 technique	 is	 used	 especially	 in	headlines,	 since	 they	 are	 the	selling	point	of	the	news.	Traditionally,	most	of	the	content	decisions	were	made	by	editors	and	re-porters	following	professionally-established	criteria	(newsworthiness	and	news	value)	about	audi-ences’	informational	needs	in	order	to	be	better-informed	citizens:	a	gatekeeping	process	in	which	the	audience	had	little	input	(Wolf,	1987).	In	their	most	commercial	facet,	news	corporations	need	to	capture	readers’	attention,	engage	the	audience	with	the	news	piece	in	order	to	“sell”	the	story,	and,	as	a	consequence,	attract	advertisement,	and	make	a	profit.	A	simple	A/B	testing	would	have	a	news	report	released	with	two	competing	versions	of	its	title:	half	of	the	audience	sees	one	version	and	the	other	half	sees	the	other.	The	testing	period	is	usually	short,	but	can	vary	from	a	few	minutes	to	many	hours.	Only	a	portion	of	the	readers	will	participate	in	this	blind	test,	though	it	can	be	extended	by	the	editor	and	combined	with	other	forms	of	person-alization,	such	as	targeting	specific	audiences	with	words	that	they	favour	the	most.	In	the	end,	the	title	with	the	best	performance,	usually	by	number	of	clicks,	is	chosen	for	the	final	and	stable	ver-sion	of	 the	news.	The	presumption	of	 this	test	 is	 that	the	most	interesting	 titles	correlate	with	the	
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one	chosen	by	the	majority	of	 the	readers.	However,	while	this	can	work	well	 to	 increase	reader-ship	and	sales,	it	does	not	necessarily	deliver	the	most	interesting	content.	The	question	is	not	qual-itative,	but	a	quantitative	one,	since	readers	do	not	directly	compare	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	two	titles	and	choose	the	best	one.	In	fact,	the	best	title	is	the	one	that	receives	more	clicks:	not	the	most	
interesting,	but	the	one	with	the	best	performance.	The	headlines	are	not,	however,	just	revolving	doors	that	screen	and	count	readers	as	they	enter	the	story;	they	also	carry	discursive	meaning	in	themselves	(Andrew,	2007;	Dor,	2003).	A/B	testing	can	be	used	to	manipulate	the	audience	to	increase	revenue	reproducing	the	so-called	“click	bait,”2	as	 well	 as	 to	 reinforce	 cultural	 and	 social	 biases.	 Indeed,	 what	 are	 the	 implications,	 biases,	 and	tendencies	that	might	emerge	from	a	title	selected	by	the	first	wave	of	readers?	What	happens,	for	instance,	when	a	newspaper	does	an	A/B	testing	at	7	am	in	Montreal	when	people	in	Vancouver	are	still	asleep?	Moreover,	 the	participants-readers	are	not	aware	of	the	experiment,	which	can	cause	distortions	 in	 the	way	 that	 an	 event	 is	 represented:	 readers	 cannot	 know	 if	 they	 are	 getting	 the	right	information	or	even	the	same	information	as	other	readers.	It	is	possible	that	a	series	of	blind	tests	and	the	use	of	black	box	algorithms	in	news	practices	can	provoke	serious	consequences,	in-cluding	alternative	ways	to	describe	an	event	that	reaffirms	social	bias	and	delivers	what	the	audi-ence	want	to	see,	not	what	the	news	is	about.	
	
Automated	News	
	Algorithms	are	also	used	to	automatize	content	creation,	which	can	reduce	and,	 in	some	contexts,	eliminate	human	input	in	the	process.	While	artificial	intelligence	can	be	programmed	to	generate	automated	 reports	 based	 on	 quantitative	 data,	machine	 learning	 can	 be	 used	 to	 build	 robots	 (or	“bots”)	that	can	“learn”	from	and	make	predictions	based	on	collected	data.	Today,	the	technology	necessary	 to	 replace	 reporters	 and	 editors	 is	 still	 in	 its	 infancy,	 but	 there	 are	 some	 experiments	around	this	theme.	For	example,	the	Los	Angeles	Times	developed	Quakebot,	an	algorithm	to	pro-duce	simple	reports	on	earthquakes	in	southern	California	(Walker,	2014).	In	2014,	the	Associated	Press	was	 the	 first	 news	 agency	 to	 adopt	 software	 to	 produce	more	 complex	 automated	 stories	(Marconi,	Siegman,	&	Machine	 Journalist,	2017).	Consider	also	 the	case	of	Quill,	developed	by	the	start-up	company	Narrative	Science.	It	can	generate	complete	news	stories	based	on	raw	data,	such	as	sport	events	scores/stats,	financial	reports,	or	housing	and	survey	data	(Narrative	Science,	n.d.).	Indeed,	 these	well-structured	quantitative	reports	can	easily	be	automated	 into	 the	 traditional	structure	 of	 a	 news	 story.	 The	 summary	 news	 lead	 style,	 a	 common	 and	widely-used	method	 of	writing	news	stories,	is	a	highly	structured	and	systematized	way	to	deliver	the	most	important	in-formation	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 news	piece	—	who,	when,	where,	why,	what,	 and	how	are	 ad-dressed	in	the	story’s	first	paragraph.	Developments	in	Natural	Language	Processing	and	Artificial	Intelligence	have	already	enabled	computers	to	produce	meaningful	and	readable	information	from	chunks	of	text	or	datasets,	just	like	its	human	counterpart	would	do.	These	bots	are	programmed	to	find	patterns	in	datasets	and	craft	meaningful	information	to	be	distributed	 and	 consumed	by	 the	 public.	However,	 in	 principle,	 data	 has	 no	 particular	 quality	 or	meaning;	newsworthiness,	as	well	as	any	other	meaningful	value	that	may	be	harvested	 from	the	dataset,	 is	 a	 social	 construct	 and	 has	 to	 be	 carefully	 inserted	 into	 the	 algorithm.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Quakebot,	 the	algorithms	 “knows”	 that	 “a	magnitude	 less	 than	3.0	means	 it’s	probably	not	worth	freaking	out	about,	a	lesson	that	over-eager	wire	reporters	don’t	always	grasp”	(Oremus	&	Brogan,	2014,	 n.p).	 That	 is,	 the	 threshold	 of	 what	 is	 noteworthy	 is	 hard-coded	 in	 the	 system.	 While	Quakebot	can	only	work	with	the	data	generated	and	collected	by	the	U.S.	Geological	Survey,	Narra-tive	Science	(n.d.)	claims	that	their	software	uses	specific	sets	of	data	to	answer	questions	about	the	
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state	of	the	world	and	frame	stories	that	best	suit	the	audiences.	In	other	words,	beyond	simply	re-porting	on	the	data,	the	machine	interprets	it	for	us.	What	becomes	evident	by	the	rhetoric	of	the	companies	that	produce	these	tools	is	the	promise	that	these	bots	will	write	more	comprehensive	and	objective	stories	than	any	human	reporter.	Not	surprisingly,	algorithmic	media	operates	under	the	same	assumption	as	more	traditional	media.	It	is	perceived	as	objective	and	reliable	to	produce	representations	of	reality,	following	the	same	val-ues	 long	attached	to	the	 institution	of	 journalism.	Additionally,	 these	examples	demonstrate	tech-nologies	used	to	produce	short	reports	on	subjects	that	are	highly	quantitative,	such	as	natural	dis-asters,	financial	updates,	and	sports	events.	In	the	long	run,	however,	the	civic	impact	of	such	tech-nologies	may	be	more	problematic.	What	happens	when	media	companies	start	to	use	these	meth-ods	to	report	on	qualitative	events	that	are	harder	to	measure,	or	at	least	controversial	by	nature,	such	as	political	and	social	issues?	What	specific	sets	of	data	would	interpret	the	world	for	us?	It	is	important	to	understand	who	is	going	to	define	the	parameters	of	these	machines,	based	on	what	kind	of	epistemology	and	political	ideology	they	will	be	built	on,	and	for	what	purpose.		
Shared	Gatekeeping		In	the	digital	age,	the	amount	of	generated	data	available	to	the	reader	has	grown	exponentially,	but	our	 capabilities	 to	 absorb	 this	 information	 have	 not	 increased.	 According	 to	 Bozdag	 (2013),	 it	 is	precisely	 “because	 the	mind’s	 information	 processing	 capacity	 is	 biologically	 limited,	 we	 get	 the	feeling	of	being	overwhelmed	by	the	number	of	choices	and	end	up	with	‘bounded	rationality’”	(p.	211).	Not	surprisingly,	news	organizations	began	to	use	algorithms	to	assist	audiences	navigating	the	increasingly	complex	and	fragmented	media	environment:	search	engine,	recommendation	sys-tems,	aggregators,	data	curation,	and	customization	to	facilitate	search,	navigation,	and	selection	in	a	 content	 overloaded	 environment	 (C.	 Anderson,	 2006).	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 content	 has	 become	commodified,	with	its	true	value	residing	in	the	system	built	to	aid	users	to	navigate	and	select	from	the	profusion	of	available	content	(Napoli,	2014),	and	create	and	share	more	information.	Performing	all	 of	 these	 actions	manually	without	 the	help	of	 technology	 is	no	 longer	practical	nor	effective.	On	the	consumption	side,	news	organizations,	including	those	that	insist	upon	avoid-ing	such	categorization	(Herbst,	2016)	such	as	search	engines	and	social	media,	use	algorithms	in	two	non-exclusive	ways:	selection	and	visibility.	These	two	interrelated	functions	often	occur	in	a	sequence	and	can	be	understood	as	a	set	of	filters.	Furthermore,	they	resonate	the	roles	of	journal-ism	identified	earlier:	 in	response	to	a	 ‘problem	of	scale’	(Lesage	&	Hackett,	2014)	 it	provides	re-ports	about	meaningful	and	interesting	events	(Wolf,	1987).	
	
Selection	
	It	 is	 commonsensical	 to	 think	 that	with	 the	 increasing	popularity	of	 online	media	 and	 social	net-works	the	audience	gains	greater	control	over	news	selection	and	can	focus	on	issues	that	they	con-sider	more	 relevant,	which	 in	 turn	empowers	audiences	and	 reduce	 the	degree	of	 editorial	 influ-ence	over	the	news	production.	However,	Bozdag	(2013)	affirms	that	the	“gatekeeping	process	 in	online	information	services	is	more	than	a	simple	transition	from	editor	selection	to	audience	selec-tion	or	from	biased	human	decisions	to	neutral	computerized	selections”	(p.	214).	Online	platforms,	such	as	Google	and	Facebook,	follow	the	same	protocols	developed	by	news	organizations:	selecting,	organizing,	distributing,	and	displaying	information	according	to	predefined	and	well-curated	crite-ria.	They	usually	do	not	provide	equal	channels	for	every	user,	and	since	they	work	as	commercial	
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ventures	 following	certain	social	and	cultural	 ideologies,	 they	are	prone	to	biases	as	much	as	any	other	previous	mass	media	channel.	In	the	selection	stage,	a	search	engine	will	automatically	crawl	the	web,	while	a	social	network	site	will	 collect	 information	produced	by	 its	users.	 It	 appears	 that	 the	outcome	—	a	 collection	of	links	and	social	media	posts	—	is	representative	of	reality.	However,	these	results	have	a	number	of	limitations,	such	as:	off-line	information	is	certainly	absent;	not	all	digitally-available	information	is	accessible	to	the	algorithm	(e.g.,	newspapers,	and	scientific	 journals	paywalls);	privacy	protection	in	social	media	content	can	prevent	 the	search	engine	 from	collecting	 information.	Moreover,	 if	a	source	has	 a	 bad	 reputation,	 like	 an	 illegal	website,	 or	has	 copyright	 infringements,	 it	 can	be	 ex-cluded	or	blocked	from	the	search	selection	by	the	search	engine	owners.	However,	because	infor-mation	filtering	is	an	automated	process,	it	might	be	manipulated	by	third-party	activities,	such	as	the	 case	 of	 Search	 Engine	 Optimization	 (SEO)	 techniques,	 or	 “like	 farms”	 on	 Facebook	 (De	 Cris-tofaro,	Friedman,	Jourjon,	Kaafar,	&	Shafiq,	2014).	To	avoid	and	inhibit	these	strategies,	commercial	organizations	have	a	tendency	toward	internal	process	opacity,	creating	protocols	to	prevent	oth-ers	from	“gaming”	the	system,	to	protect	competitive	advantages,	as	well	as	to	promote	their	own	services	and	products.	This	is	precisely	the	reason	that	Google	puts	its	own	services	at	the	top	of	the	search	results	and	that	Facebook	prioritizes	its	own	video	platform	(Bucher,	2012;	Bozdag,	2013).	Sorting	and	prioritizing	this	information	is	another	crucial	step,	resembling	the	concept	of	news	value	 (Wolf,	 1987).	 Popularity	 is	 the	most-used	metric	 in	 classifying	 information:	while	 a	 search	engine	gives	more	weight	to	information	coming	from	popular	websites	in	order	to	support	majori-ty	interests	and	values,	a	social	media	platform	prioritizes	engagement	with	the	content.	A	Google	search	result,	for	instance,	only	shows	ten	websites	at	a	time	and	tends	to	favour	popular	sources	of	information	which	have	more	hyperlinks	 leading	 to	 these	 sites,	 are	optimized	 for	mobile	phones,	and	are	paid	to	be	at	the	top	of	the	list.	Some	authors,	like	Flichy	(2008),	have	called	this	phenome-non	 “googlearchy”	 (Google	 +	 hierarchy).	 However,	 similar	 to	 the	 A/B	 testing,	what	 the	 audience	clicks	the	most	is	not	always	the	most	interesting	or	newsworthy	piece	of	information.	If	in	the	past	newsworthiness	was	defined	by	journalistic	deontology,	the	opacity	of	algorithmic	media	makes	it	more	complicated	to	define	what	is	newsworthy	in	a	fast,	dynamic,	and	very	personalized	environ-ment.		
	
Visibility	
	The	media	industry	is	built	around	parameters	of	visibility	(Bucher,	2012;	Wolf,	1987).	While	print-ing	press	journalism	carefully	organizes	physical	spaces	through	a	human	editorial	process,	digital	media	revolves	around	algorithmically-tailored	topics	based	on	demography,	ideology,	commercial	interest,	and	user	preferences.	That	is,	while	in	traditional	media	the	likelihood	that	an	event	will	be	reported	depends	on	the	current	public	agenda	followed	by	each	news	outlet	(Wolf,	1987),	in	digi-tal	media,	the	audience	has	a	role	in	defining	this	agenda:	individuals	and	institutions	mutually	pro-duce	 the	media	environment	 (Bucher,	2012).	Napoli	 (2014)	argues	 that	 this	process	 leads	 to	 im-portant	patterns,	 such	as	a	 “certain	amount	of	 reflexivity	 that	 is	 inherent	 in	much	algorithmically	driven	media	 consumption”	 (p.	346).	 For	 instance,	 in	Bucher’s	 (2012)	examination	of	Facebook’s	GraphRank	algorithm,	she	shows	that	the	algorithm	monitors	users’	behaviour	to	find	the	most	in-teresting	 patterns.	 Once	 these	 patterns	 are	 found,	 they	 are	 fed	 back	 to	 the	 users	 via	 Facebook’s	News	Feed.	Consequently,	“even	more	users	will	apparently	act	in	the	way	that	the	algorithm	pre-dicts”	(p.	14).	Ørmen	(2016)	points	out	that	technical	settings	like	language	and	IP	address	matter	when	users	are	 searching	 online.	 Digital	 platforms	 have	 access	 to	 a	 large	 number	 of	 different	 types	 of	 infor-
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mation	about	their	audience,	which	make	it	is	possible	to	“target”	individual	readers.	That	is,	to	dis-play	or	allow	access	to	stories	specifically	tailored	to	users	based	on	their	locations,	behaviour,	and	preferences.	Consider	the	case	of	Twitter’s	Trend	topics	that	provides	users	with	a	list	of	the	most	popular	subjects	currently	being	discussed	on	 the	platform.	This	 list	 is	algorithmically	 tailored	 to	each	user	based	on	their	location,	language,	and	the	people	they	follow,	as	well	as	the	topics’	“fresh-ness”.	The	large	number	of	variables	results	in	a	dynamism	that	can	also	lead	to	unpredictability	of	what	is	really	a	“trend”	at	any	given	time	in	the	system,	showing	users	only	what	they	already	ex-pect	to	see.	Ultimately,	this	raises	questions	of	censorship,	as	in	the	controversy	over	the	seemingly	premature	disappearance	of	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	movement	from	the	Twitter	Trends	list	(Gilles-pie,	2012).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 term	“trend”	might	even	have	 lost	 its	meaning,	becoming	more	 like	a	“click	 bait”	 based	 on	 the	 user’s	 bias,	 since	 the	 trends	 list	 distorts	 (and	perhaps	manipulates)	 the	sense	of	reality,	making	people	believe	that	some	topics	are	more	important	than	others	in	a	given	moment.	This	is	a	major	concern	because	of	the	influential	role	search	engines	and	social	media	have	to-day.	They	are	perceived	as	objective	and	reliable	representations	of	relevant	online	content,	similar	attribute	long	attached	to	journalism.	In	other	words,	“the	algorithms	that	are	at	the	core	of	search	engines	 are	 functioning	 in	 a	 political	 capacity	 similar	 to	 established	media	 institutions”	 (Napoli,	2014,	p.	348).	Not	surprisingly,	news	organizations	create	and	use	algorithms	that	embed	their	in-stitutional	nature,	including	political	and	ideological	inclinations.	For	instance,	election	results	can	be	affected	by	manipulation	of	search	engine	rankings.	It	is	a	common	practice	now	to	look	up	can-didates’	profiles	using	search	engines	and	social	media.	Depending	on	how	the	algorithms	rank	pos-itive	and	negative	news	stories	on	the	screen,	it	can	have	an	enormous	influence	on	the	way	people	vote:	 it	 is	estimated	that	Google	could	determine	the	outcome	of	upwards	of	25	percent	of	all	na-tional	elections	(Epstein	&	Robertson,	2015;	Pfeiffer,	2014).	These	examples	put	algorithmic	media	protocols	in	resonance	with	traditional	media	practice	in	relation	to	the	presence	or	lack	of	media	coverage	over	specific	issues	within	political	contexts,	which	also	reaffirms	their	role	as	gatekeep-ers.	
	
Subjectivity	
	Decision-making	 is	 often	 permeated	with	 idiosyncrasies	 due	 to	 the	 heavy	 involvement	 of	 human	subjectivity	in	the	various	processes	of	production.	Traditional	media	developed	newsmaking	pro-tocols	such	as	news	value	and	newsworthiness	to	improve	efficiency	and	pursue	objectivity.	Online	web	services	 frequently	claim	 that	 such	human	bias	does	not	exist	 in	 their	 systems,	as	 their	core	operations	are	 completely	automated	 (Herbst,	2016).	Yet,	 this	 is	 a	problematic	 claim,	 since	 these	systems	are	still	driven	by	editorial	decisions	made	by	humans.	While	Google	has	admitted	that	the	company	manually	 demotes	websites	 (Metz,	 2011),	 Facebook	 has	 been	 accused	 several	 times	 of	censorship	due	to	its	(opaque)	policy	of	removing	posts	labeled	as	offensive,	such	as	the	case	of	a	picture	of	women	breastfeeding	 (“FB	vs.	Breastfeeding”	 group	on	Facebook),	 or	 two	men	kissing	(Bozdag,	2013).	To	solve	the	centralized	bias	problem	and	avoid	being	classified	as	editors,	 these	companies	to	make	users	accountable	for	these	decisions.	Facebook,	 for	example,	argues	that	 it	 is	not	against	breastfeeding	 in	particular;	 it	 just	 follows	what	 its	users	 label	as	 inappropriate	(Face-book,	n.d).	Participatory	audience	and	crowd-sourcing	are	concepts	usually	coupled	with	decentralization	of	 the	mediation	 process	 and	 democratization	 of	 communication.	 Indeed,	more	 participation	 can	reduce	the	effects	of	 technical	bias	 induced	by	algorithms	 in	online	 intermediaries	(Bentes,	2015;	Carlson,	2007),	but	they	can	also	be	used	to	enhance	the	“gatekeeping”	effect.	Media	corporations	
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are	heavily	 investing	 in	 “profiling”	users	 to	 reach	a	higher	 level	of	personalization,	which	 can	 re-duce	 the	 structural	 biases	 inherent	 to	 popularity-based	 metrics.	 That	 is,	 by	 combining	 various	sources	of	data,	such	as	demography,	location,	technical	information	captured	by	electronic	devices,	personal	preferences,	and	inferred	behaviour	derived	from	online	activities,	media	companies	can	tailor	and	deliver	the	“most	interesting”	news	according	to	the	user’s	definition	of	interesting.	However,	this	is	quite	opposite	from	reporting	public	interest	stories:	the	importance	to	report	on	 events	 that	 somehow	 impact	 the	 public	 life,	 including	 those	 that	 are	 unknown	or	 exceptional	(Bucher,	 2012;	Wolf,	 1987).	 Algorithmic	media	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 lock	 individuals	 in	 a	 “social	bubble”	in	which	people	are	exposed	only	to	information	from	like-minded	individuals,	amplifying	confirmation	bias	(Pariser,	2012).	Or,	as	Bozdag	(2013)	puts	it,	“online	services	can	cause	citizens	to	be	ill-informed	about	current	events	and	may	have	increasingly	idiosyncratic	perceptions	about	the	importance	of	current	events	and	political	issues”	(p.	218).	Personalization	improves	accuracy	at	the	expense	of	serendipity.	The	problem	is	that	in	the	long	run,	it	will	assist	us	to	unconsciously	avoid	facts	and	opinions	we	disagree	with,	potentially	undermining	deliberative	democracy	by	lim-iting	contradictory	information.		
Conclusion		The	news	report	is	not	simply	a	collection	of	random	symbols;	it	obeys	some	sort	of	rule.	Media	or-ganizations	encode	information	on	behalf	of	the	individual	based	on	routine	decisions	and	accord-ing	 to	 a	 set	 of	parameters	 (language,	practices,	 goals).	As	Hall	 (1980)	 states,	 “the	event	must	be-come	a	‘story’	before	it	can	become	a	communicative	event”	(p.	129).	At	that	moment,	the	rules	of	society	act	upon	the	event;	there	are	social	and	political	consequences	when	an	event	is	designated	as	important	or	interesting:	production	constructs	the	message.	Algorithms	are	not	neutral	and	objective	machines.	Quite	the	opposite;	they	reflect	a	certain	ide-ology	embedding	a	set	of	rules	and	practices:	they	prescribe	a	way	to	do	things.	Like	any	other	insti-tution,	news	organizations	are	ideological	and	have	specific	social,	cultural,	economic,	and	political	agendas.	 In	 this	 domain,	 algorithms	 serve	 as	 prime	 examples	 of	 constructors	 and	 codifiers	 of	knowledge,	particularly	in	the	context	of	search	engines,	social	media,	and	news	portals,	which	play	a	 central	 institutional	 role	 in	 aggregating,	 categorizing,	 organizing,	 and	broadcasting	 information.	Consequently,	the	adoption	of	algorithms	in	newsmaking	practices	by	traditional	and	new	media	is	not	disrupting	journalism	practices	and	values,	but	rather	reproducing	them	in	the	digital	space.	Perhaps	what	is	different	about	the	algorithms	adoption	in	the	newsmaking	practice	is	the	level	of	automatization,	since	 they	are	built	 to	run	without	any	human	assistance.	As	a	consequence,	 it	seems	that	we	are	losing	our	ability	and	even	our	wiliness	to	inquire	about	the	world.	Algorithmic	media	reads	data	without	asking	any	questions;	it	just	repeats	what	is	embedded	in	its	codes.	They	rely	on	data	and	internal	assumptions,	both	subject	to	biases	and	errors,	which	might	produce	un-expected	and	unintended	consequences.	Yet,	they	go	beyond	their	assumed	role	and	function	of	aid-ing	 in	media	production	and	consumption,	 as	 they	 serve	as	 instruments	of	 institutional	power	at	the	same	time	 that	 they	are	shaped	by	 the	already-defined	rules	and	protocols	of	 the	 institutions	that	use	them.	In	this	sense,	algorithmic	media	are	nothing	less	than,	and	indeed	no	different	from	any	attempt	to	formalize	idealized	newsmaking	practices	and	protocols	to	establish	the	authority	of	hegemonic	power	to	control	flows	of	information.		
Notes		
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1.	I	do	not	mean	to	argue	that	technology	has	absolute	power	over	the	user,	but	to	emphasize	the	accelerated	feedback	loop	in	which	digital	technology	is	built	upon.	Users	often	do	have	some	level	of	agency	to	actively	avoid	algorithmic	logic,	as	well	as	to	reappropriate,	hack,	and	hijack	technolo-gy	in	different	ways	through	everyday	practices	(see	De	Certeau,	2002;	Proulx,	2009).	2.	Click	bait	is	an	advertising	strategy	to	attract	attention	and	encourage	visitors	to	click	on	a	link	that	usually	has	little	or	no	connection	with	the	content	being	linked.	It	is	often	paid	for	by	the	ad-vertiser	or	generates	income	based	on	the	number	of	clicks.		
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